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Dynamics of new party formation in the Czech Republic 1996-2010: Looking for 
the origins of a ‘political earthquake’ 
 
Introduction 
Together with Hungary and Slovenia, the Czech Republic was until recently one of a 
small number of Central and East European (CEE) democracies, whose relatively 
closed and stable patterns of party politics made them broad outward approximations 
of West European type party systems. From its consolidation in 1992-6, the Czech 
party system, in particular, was characterised by a pattern of stability centred on the 
continual parliamentary presence of four strong parties with ‘standard’ political 
profiles which had integrated relatively successfully with West European party 
families: the Civic Democratic Party (ODS), the Czech Social Democratic Party 
(ČSSD), the Christian Democratic Union – Czechoslovak People’s Party (KDU-ČSL) 
and the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KSČM). Although the Czech 
political scene was marked by some electoral volatility, this seems largely to have 
taken the form of voters shifting between these four established actors, rather 
stemming from the successful emergence of new contenders (Powell and Tucker 
2009; Mainwaring et al 2009; Deegan-Krause and Haughton 2010).
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 A partial 
exception to this pattern could be found in what might be termed the ‘liberal centre’ 
of Czech politics which generated a succession of small short-lived market-oriented 
parties all seeking in different ways to combine economic liberalism with quality of 
governance issues such as ecology, decentralisation and civil society development 
(Pšeja and Mareš 2005; Deegan-Krause and Haughton 2010; Hanley 2010a).  Overall, 
however the Czech party system could be viewed as consolidated and stable one with 
little scope – or little or no need – for significant new parties to emerge.   
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The results of the 2010 Czech parliamentary elections shattered such assumptions. 
Not only did the support for two main parties slump to historically low levels - the 
Civic Democrats received their lowest ever national vote, the Social Democrats their 
worst result since 1992 – but one of the four pillars of the Czech party system, the 
Christian Democrats, were eliminated from the Chamber of Deputies, the lower house 
of the Czech parliament. Moreover, in 2010 not one but two new parties, TOP09 and 
Public Affairs (VV) broke into parliament, taking a combined total of 26.7 per cent of 
votes cast. As Deegan-Krause notes, in terms of seats and votes, the election thus 
resulted in highest number of effective parties than at any time since 1992. Adding in 
the support for small parties which did not cross the five per cent threshold for 
parliamentary representation, it can be calculated that in 2010 fully 38.5 per cent of 
the Czech electorate voted for parties formed in the previous two years (Deegan-
Krause 2010).
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 Moreover, as Deegan-Krause’s extension of Powell and Tucker’s 
calculations (illustrated in figure 1) shows, for the first time there were higher net 
numbers of Czech voters moving from established parties to new parties, rather than 
simply ‘churning’ between established parties.  
 
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Although levels of volatility and party replacement in the election were well below 
the regional maximums seen in Central and Eastern Europe since 1989 (Sikk 2005; 
Mainwaring et al 2009; Powell and Tucker 2009), and,  as this article will show, 
‘new’ parties exhibited important personnel and/or programmatic continuities with 
some existing parties, the prevalent sense among Czech politicians and commentators 
was that a moment of sudden, unexpected and far-reaching change in the party system 
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had been reached.  President Klaus, for example, declared the elections to be ‘… a 
political earthquake. You could say they haven’t left one stone standing on another’ 
(Lidové noviny 2010).
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However, the dramatic electoral breakthroughs of TOP09 and VV in 2010 may not 
entirely have been a bolt from the blue. New parties have been a persistent, if 
marginal, feature of the Czech party system for many years and it is thus unclear 
whether the success of TOP09 and VV was unprecedented only because of their levels 
of their electoral support, or whether their patterns of formation and the type of new 
party they embodied represented a break with the past.  In this article, I seek to put the 
‘political earthquake’ of 2010 into perspective by mapping the development of new 
parties in the Czech Republic over the past two decades, a period during much of 
which the Czech party system appeared consolidated or consolidating with new 
parties being a rare, unimportant or fringe phenomenon. I begin by reviewing the 
comparative literature on the nature and formation of new parties in Central and 
Eastern Europe before conducting a detailed review of new parties in the Czech party 
system and changing patterns of new party development in the Czech Republic since 
1996. I then consider possible factors that may have acted as drivers of these patterns, 
focusing in particular on whether there were common factors underlying both the long 
period of stability (and new party failure) and the sudden ‘earthquake election’ of 
2010. 
 
New parties in comparative perspective  
 ‘Genuinely new parties’  
The notion of a ‘new’ or ‘genuinely new’ party – while empirically necessary to 
measure party system stability and change - is in many ways problematic. Early 
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literature on the subject suggested that ‘non-original’ parties not present during the 
formative stage of party system formation should be regarded as ‘new’ (Harmel,1985: 
406) subject to the proviso they actually stood for office and were not alliances of 
existing parties or existing parties with changed names (Harmel and Robertson 1985: 
519, footnote 3). Later authors defined ‘genuinely new parties’ more rigorously as 
first time contenders in national elections, again excluding only groupings resulting 
from re-organisation, merger or coalition of existing parties (Hug 2001; Krouwel and 
Bosch
 
2004).  
Many authors working on post-1989 new parties in Central and Eastern Europe such 
as Tavits (2008) retained this definition.  Others, however, amended it to allow for the 
more fluid nature in party organisations in the region and the fact that continuities and 
discontinuities of party elites were often more telling than continuities and 
discontinuities of party organisation. Sikk, for example, required that ‘genuinely new 
parties’ should not only not be coalitions or merged or rebranded formations, but also 
that they ‘have a novel name and structure and do not have any important figures 
from past democratic politics among their major members’ (Sikk 2005: 399).4 
However, consistent with his understanding of CEE party systems as (potential) 
cartels, Sikk also counts  as ‘new’ persistent extra-parliamentary groupings even 
where they are not first time electoral contenders. Powell and Tucker take a similar 
approach defining as a ‘new’ any grouping which newly receives two per cent of the 
vote after the first or second free elections, thus covering parties that did not exist 
during early party system formation and persistent minor parties (Powell and Tucker 
2009). Such issues of definition raise important questions about how exactly we 
should understand both ‘new’ parties and the ‘normal’ established state of party 
systems that ‘new’ parties challenge: should we view new parties essentially as new 
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contenders periodically upsetting the equilibrium of dynamic but stable electoral 
markets, as definitions based on the post-1945 West European experience such as that 
of Hug (2001) imply?
 
Or should we also see a normal party system as one in a state of 
continual ‘churning’ – closer to the experience of CEE - in which yesterday’s 
successful ‘new’ party contenders become today’s ‘established’ parties and 
themselves face immediate challenge from newcomers?  
  
Factors underlying new party formation 
Much early discussion based on the experience of West European party systems of the 
1970s and 1980s tended to link new party emergence to the rise of new issues 
stemming in turn from changes in socio-cultural and socio-economic structures.  
Institutional factors such as electoral systems, while acknowledged, were seen as 
secondary. Perhaps the best known example of such explanation was the hypothesis 
explaining the emergence of West European Green parties as based on an expanding 
left-libertarian constituency of voters with ‘post-material’ values (Müller-Rommel 
1989; Kitschelt 1989). Subsequent work on new parties - less tied to explaining the 
development of particular party families– tended to give more explanatory weight to 
institutional factors such as the permissiveness of electoral systems, electoral 
registration requirements, state funding of minor parties and changes in the 
competitive environment such as the ideological convergence of established parties 
(Willey 1998; Hug 2001; Krouwel and Bosch 2004). 
Research on new party formation in post-communist democracies tended to further 
discount the notion of new parties as primarily the expression of new social cleavages 
or bearers of new issues. Instead, it stressed the role of institutional incentives in 
opening up opportunities for political entrepreneurs and highlighted conjunctural 
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factors such as bouts of public frustration with reform or the widespread perception of 
politicians in the region as self-seeking and corrupt (Sikk 2005; Deegan-Krause 2007; 
Pop-Eleches 2010). Even when they appear to be ‘standard’ programmatic 
formations, new entrants to post-communist party systems may be thus largely 
explicable as successful exercises in political entrepreneurship backed by a favourable 
conjuncture of institutional opportunities, public opinion and existing parties’ 
competitive strategies (Sikk and Andersen 2009). 
Both sociological and institutional perspectives on the new parties, however, also 
arguably need to be supplemented by explanations highlighting the micro-foundations 
of party emergence: a political party can also be viewed as an organisational solution 
to a collective action problem, in which participants contribute and exchange a variety 
of resources (financial, material, technical skills, time, publicity and electoral support) 
to generate political outcomes (public goods) that would not otherwise be achievable 
acting on an individual or ad hoc basis (Aldrich 1995; Hopkin 1999). Such 
perspectives highlight the fact that successful new parties not only need sufficient 
money, media and human resources, but also that it can offer, as Lucardie (2000: 176) 
terms it, a ‘relevant political project’ of interest to potential members and supporters. 
To emerge a party needs to accumulate sufficient resources and political 
entrepreneurs need to effectively co-ordinate such exchange by the creating forms of 
organisation that can overcome collective action problems. 
 
Typologies of new parties 
The debate on sociological and/or institutionally drivers of new party formation is 
also reflected in typologies of new parties identified in the literature. In a seminal 
article, Lucardie categorises new parties in Western Europe by origin and self-chosen 
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role into three types: prolocutor parties, which represent neglected or unrepresented 
interests; purifiers, which seek to articulate existing party traditions in more 
principled and authentic forms; and prophets which introduce genuinely new 
ideological themes into party competition (Lucardie 2000). Sikk (2005, 2011) 
however, posits the existence of an additional type of new party, which lacks any 
clear conventional ideology or chosen constituency, and is instead animated by a 
vague ‘project of newness’. Such party projects, often but not exclusively found in 
CEE, promise the ‘…purification of country’s politics, for instance, from corruption, 
while remaining in the ideological mainstream and not anti-system’ (Sikk 2011: 3).5 
As illustrated in table 1, Sikk then integrates the four types of new party appeal into a 
two-dimensional model defined on one axis by the extent to which appeals are 
ideological, and on the other by the extent to which they overlap with those of 
established parties. 
 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
 New party emergence in the Czech Republic 
Identifying new Czech parties 
The rich data on Czech political parties makes it a fairly straightforward to identify 
and categorise new parties.
6
 A more difficult question, however – both for the Czech 
case and for the study of new party emergence in CEE generally – is  the question of 
when we should take the party system as being formed and which parties we should 
consider ‘established’: that is, what baseline we should use to map new party 
emergence against. More specifically, we need to consider whether we should take the 
first post-communist elections as ‘founding’ the party system, or to allow for a longer 
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formative period during which established parties consolidated. Given the widely 
noted character of ‘founding elections’ as referendums on regime change and the 
clearly transitional character of the Civic Forum movement which dominated the 
1990 election in the Czech lands, I allow for such a formative period which, in 
common with other authors, I take to be 1990-2.
7
 I therefore classify new Czech 
parties in the six parliamentary elections from 1996 using the 1992 election as a 
baseline for identifying which parties were ‘established’,8 making two sets of 
classifications: one following based on new parties’ origins, the second on the nature 
of their political appeals.  
I first identify and categorise new parties by origin synthesizing the concepts of 
parties ‘newness’ as organisations into three underlying types. This, it should be 
stressed, is intended a synthesis of existing conceptualisations ‘newness’, not a 
worked out counter typology. I thus do not take a position on the nature  of  party 
‘genuine newness’ or where its boundaries should lie, seeking rather to highlight that 
the concept of party ‘newness’ is best seen as graduated and multi-dimensional 
The three underlying types of organisationally ‘new parties’ identifiable in the 
literature are: 1) first time electoral contenders, which have no organisational or 
personnel links with established parties (henceforth for brevity ‘first time electoral 
contenders’); 2) breakaway parties splitting from established parties (or largely 
founded by elites breaking away from them); and 3) persistent minor parties, which 
have previously contested elections, but never independently gained election to 
parliament. The first two are a subset of the broader category of parties, contesting 
national elections for the first time. However, given high levels of party merger and 
fragmentation in some CEE states, few if any authors use a definition unqualified by 
some indication of organisational or elite continuity.
 9
 Conceptually, it is thus not 
 9 
possible for a party to belong to both categories 1 and 2.
10
 The third concept, although 
less common in the literature, follows Schedler’s (1996: 299) line of argument that 
‘smallness and marginality may serve as functional equivalent to novelty’. A 
summary of ‘new’ party support in the Czech Republic viewed in terms of this 
threefold division is given in figure 2. A full classification of ‘new’ parties and 
electoral scores can be found in appendix 1 
 
[FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Patterns of Czech new party development 
If we take ‘new’ parties by origin, as figure 2 shows, in most elections since 1996 
overall electoral support for Czech ‘new’ parties of all types totals was a consistent 
11-12 per cent – the exceptions are 1998, when the Freedom Union entered 
parliament, and the ‘earthquake election’ of 2010. However, there is considerable 
variation across elections in the relative support for different types of new party and 
only a few clear trends.  First, as  figures 3 and 4 show, there was a spike in the 
numbers of new first time contenders in 2002, which (although since declining) have 
continued a relatively high level since suggesting that new party formation has 
become an attractive strategy for political entrepreneurs.
 
 
 
[FIGURES 3 AND 4 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Second, compared to other types of new party formation, new breakaway parties are 
relatively rare in Czech politics and have declined rapidly in number since the initial 
stabilisation of the Czech party system. As figure 3 shows, only six breakaways can 
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be identified after 1996, suggesting that, at least in formal organisational terms, both 
established and minor parties had a high degree of continuity and stability. However, 
when they do emerge from established parties – as with the formation of the Freedom 
Union created in 1998 by political opponents of the then Civic Democrat (ODS) 
leader and outgoing Prime Minister Václav Klaus, many of whom were cabinet 
ministers or parliamentarians - new breakaway parties often have immediate electoral 
success. Similarly the leadership of TOP09, the larger of the two new parties breaking 
through in 2010, was largely composed of prominent former Christian Democrats and 
its leader was the current Czech Foreign Minister, Karel Schwarzenberg, a diplomat n 
independent politician with an aristocratic background closely associated with former 
President Havel first brought into ministerial office in 2007 as a nominee of the Green 
Party.
11
 
Third, and following from this, it is clear that resources and political experience were 
more important for success than the pure novelty of being a first time electoral 
contender. Across the five elections in 1996-2010 new electoral contenders were 
(narrowly) outperformed by persistent minor parties, which were in turn out-
performed by better resourced. Pooling performances across the five elections the 
mean vote for new first time contenders was 0.73 per cent, while persistent minor 
parties polled a mean vote of 0.85 and new breakaways 4.53 per cent. Median scores 
which allow better for the influence of a few atypically highly successful new parties 
show a similar picture: new first time contenders’ median vote was 0.2 per cent, while 
persistent minor parties gained a median 0.29 percent and breakaways 1.4 per cent. 
Expressed differently, only 8.5 per cent of first time contenders gained 1.5 per cent or 
above – the current threshold for state funding of electoral expenses in the Czech 
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Republic – while for persistent minor party lists the proportion was 17.2 per cent. 
Fully 42.9 per cent of new breakaways (three of sever cases) achieved this. 
This suggests that, at least in the Czech context, any trade-off between the benefits of 
inherent novelty and the recognition, credibility resources and skills offered by pre-
existing organisation and ‘recycling’ experienced politicians is heavily weighted 
towards the latter. This reinforces the argument that ‘newness’ is best understood as a 
political or programmatic project, rather than something based on more objective 
measures of newcomer or outsider status. Moreover, the very limited advantage 
persistent minor parties enjoyed over new contenders emphasises what a hostile 
environment the Czech party system historically represented for enduring extra-
parliamentary parties and suggests that for resource-poor political entrepreneurs a 
long, slow strategy of party building from the grassroots yielded few dividends. 
 
The political appeals of Czech new parties  
If we attempt to categorise ‘new’ parties in the Czech Republic by political appeals in 
terms of Sikk’s two-dimensional re-working of Lucardie’s typology, as table 2 
shows, it is clear that by far the most electorally and significant parties were ‘purifier’ 
parties of the centre or centre-right seeking to offer an improved or reformed form of 
the conservative or liberal conservative ideology of established Czech centre-right 
parties.
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 The three principal centre-right ‘purifiers’ were the Democratic Union, 
Freedom Union (US) and TOP09.  These parties’ appeals stressed distinct quality of 
governance themes such as civil society development and ethics in public life and 
stressed their newcomer credentials when competing against established parties 
whose reform aspirations had (supposedly) become bogged down by corruption and 
attitudes inherited from the communist past.
13
 However, all three parties sought 
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primarily to present themselves as mainstream centre-right groupings offering more 
genuine forms of conservatism or liberal-conservatism than established parties such 
the Civic Democratic Party or Christian Democrats, which could act as a corrective to 
these parties’ failings in transforming the Czech Republic into a modern West 
European-style market society (Pšeja and Mareš 2005). Perhaps unsurprisingly, the 
two most successful ‘purifiers’, the Freedom Union (US) and TOP09, were also 
relatively well resourced ‘breakaway’ parties, whose founders and leaders were 
leading politicians in established parties. 
 Interestingly, there were no significant ‘purifier’ parties of the left or centre-left, 
offering a reformulated communist or social-democratic project. The only political 
formations on the left which seem to fit this category were small, ill-fated parties 
founded by reformed-minded Communists in the mid-1990s (the Left Bloc (LB) and 
Party of the Democratic Left (SDL)) which attempted to offer a ‘democratic socialist’ 
alternative to conventional social democracy and the orthodox communist position of 
the Communist Part of Bohemia and Moravia (KSČM).14 This imbalance in the 
supply of ‘purifer’ parties may reflect the presence of two medium-large established 
parties on the Czech left competing for a similar electorate with programmatic appeals 
centring primarily on distributional issues linked to economic management and the 
welfare state (Kopeček and Pšeja 2008).15 
Perhaps unsurprisingly in a relatively recently consolidated party system, Czech new 
parties include few unambiguous examples of ‘prophet’ parties offering ideological 
themes distinct from those of established parties. The Czech new parties which mostly 
closely qualify as ‘prophets’ are the Green Party (SZ), small radical right ‘groups 
which emerged following the collapse of the parliamentary far-right Association for 
the Republic-Republican Party of Czechoslovakia (SPR-RSČ) in 1998, including the 
 13 
Workers Party (DSSS) which contested the 2010 election, and certain eurosceptic 
groupings (Mareš 2005a).  Far-right ‘Republican’ groupings including the SPR-RSČ 
and its successors were clearly spokesmen for distinct nativist radical right populist 
ideologies (Mareš 2003; Hanley 2010b). However, the Czech Green Party lacked any 
semblance of the ideologically distinct left-libertarian profile characteristic of West 
European Green parties until the entry of NGO and social movement activists into the 
party in 2001-2. Even after this transformation, the party’s position was in many ways 
closer to the qualified market liberalism of reformist centre-right ‘purifier’ parties 
discussed above than to West European Green parties (Pečínka 2003; Kopeček 
2005a). The party’s distinct ecologist critique and identification with one of the major 
new European party families suggests, however, it could tentatively or weakly be 
classed as a ‘prophet’ party.16 New eurosceptic parties, which see the defence of 
Czech interests against the EU as a new ideology transcending left-right divisions also 
seem classifiable as ‘prophets’.17 The most prominent current example of such a 
eurosceptic ‘prophet’ is the Sovereignty bloc created in 2009 by former newsreader 
and independent MEP Jana Bobošíková  (Suverenita n.d.; Hanley 2011.)18    
 ‘Prolocutor’ parties which seek to represent neglected interests or issues appear a 
weak and declining element in the supply of Czech ‘new’ parties. The clearest 
example of such a grouping is the Pensioners for a Secure Life grouping (DŽJ) which 
emerged as minor party in 1992 and sustained itself as an extra-parliamentary party – 
by crossing the three per cent threshold for annual state funding – in two subsequent 
parliamentary elections, before collapsing after electoral failure in 2002 (Kopeček 
2005b). A second enduring ‘prolocutor’ were Moravian regionalist parties, which 
sought autonomy and enhanced recognition for the historical provinces of Moravia 
and Silesia. Despite considerable early electoral success and parliamentary 
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representation in 1990-6, they have since declined to the status of persistent minor 
parties (Mareš and Strmiska 2005). 
‘Project of newness’ parties competing with established parties on the basis of vague 
(but non-extreme) anti-establishment promises of change seem to represent a more 
dynamic and (relatively) successful new party type in the Czech Republic. The first 
group of Czech new parties which seem to fall in the ‘project of newness’ category 
are groupings of self-styled non-partisan independents. Locally based independents’ 
groupings have been a persistent feature on Czech electoral landscape at sub-national 
level and have sometimes coalesced into small national level parties (Mareš 2005b; 
Jüpter 2008). The most electorally important of these was the Nezávislí grouping 
which evolved into the Independent Democrats (NEZ) led by the former director of 
the Nova TV station, Vladimír Železný and the Association of Independents (SNK), 
which won respectively two and three MEPs in the 2004 European elections  
Although such groupings draw on well-established Czech traditions of localism and 
non-partisan engagement, they also clearly fit Sikk’s ‘project of newness’ category in 
combining mainstream views in a vague anti-establishment, anti-political rhetoric of 
change and renewal.
19
 However, unlike the ‘project of newness’ parties Sikk (2011) 
identifies in the Baltic context, such groups project their newness less by claiming 
pure outsider status, than by stressing the need to import  non-ideological expertise, 
approaches and elites from spheres such as business, education and local politics into 
national party politics.  As Schedler (1997) suggests, advocating the ‘colonisation’ of 
the political sphere in this way is represents a weak form of anti-politics as well as an 
anti-establishment appeal. 
However, the party which fits the ‘project of newness’ category most closely is the 
Public Affairs (VV) grouping led by former investigative reporter Radek John, which 
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emerged from political obscurity in the second half of 2009 and experienced a rapid 
surge in support, entering parliament in June 2010 with support of over 10 per cent. 
Although founded as a Prague-based group (in 2002) whose activities were largely 
confined to municipal politics, following the entry into the party of the businessman 
Vít Bárta and a group of associates linked to him or the ABL security company he 
owned, VV eschewed the independent and localist appeals characteristic of regional 
parties, in favour of vague, but clearly programmatic stance centring on anti-
corruption, direct democracy, reform and renewal (MFDnes
 
2011; Kmenta 2011). - 
themes serving as classic building blocks for ‘project of newness’ parties in the Baltic 
states and elsewhere in CEE (Sikk 2009, 2011). As well as recruiting a well known 
non-party-political public figure such John to lead it (in 2009), VV also sought to 
project novelty and openness through radical organisational innovations such as 
allowing registered sympathisers to vote on party policy in regular online referendums 
and heavy promotion of female candidates in its well-funded advertising (Lauder 
2010). A further, less significant, new party that seems, albeit less clearly, to fit the 
‘project of newness’ category is the Citizens’ Rights Party – Zemanites (SPOZ).  
Although and led by former Social Democrat leader Miloš Zeman and advocating 
centre-left socio-economic policies, the party made no effort to project itself as a 
‘purifier’ party, correcting the deficiencies of the established Social Democratic Party, 
laying its programmatic stress almost entirely on the need to ‘change politics’, 
represent politically discontented citizens, and fight corruption by introducing 
elements of direct democracy such as referenda and the direct election of mayors and 
regional governors (Strana práv občanů – Zemanovci n.d.). 
 
Changing new party appeals 
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In practice many, if not most, ‘new’ parties in the Czech Republic mix elements of the 
four ideal types of new party appeal, or in some cases overlap them. In some cases 
‘new’ parties arguably move between types of appeal as they develop. As a non-
partisan alliance of local politicians, the Association of Independents (SNK) for 
example was, for the reasons explained above, categorisable as a ‘project of newness’ 
party in 2002, when it first contested national parliamentary elections. However, 
SNK’s successful electoral alliance with the European Democrats (ED)20 – which 
polled 11 per cent in the 2004 European elections – and its subsequent merger with 
ED under the leadership of the former prominent ODS politician and former Foreign 
Minister Josef Zieleniec led to the adoption of a conventional programmatic stance of 
Europhile market liberalism characteristic of Czech centre-right ‘purifier’ parties.  
What is striking, however, is how in the context of stable programmatic party system 
with a single dominant (socio-economic) issue dimension (Deegan-Krause 2006), the 
most successful new Czech parties are ‘purifiers’. Moreover, new parties making 
other types of political appeal tend to lean towards the ‘purifer’ category, rather than 
fashioning new ideological positions (as ‘prophets’) or relying entirely on a radical 
‘project of newness’ anti-establishment rhetoric of renewal. Even recently formed 
parties ‘project of newness’ parties such as Public Affairs (VV) and the Citizens’ 
Rights Party SPOZ incorporated familiar programmatic elements of left and right - 
pro-market policies in healthcare and a ban on former members of the Communist 
Party joining in the case of VV, demands for economic stimulus through public 
spending in the case of SPOZ. 
 
Changing logics of Czech new party formation 
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Parallel trends are observable in the ways in which new parties have mobilised 
resources and solved collective action problems. Over the past decade few new Czech 
parties have been launched in the form of full-blown national party projects as 
occurred earlier in the 1990s with groupings such as the Moravian regionalists (HSD-
SMS), Pensioners for a Secure Life (DŽJ), the Republicans (SPR-RSČ), or the 
Democratic Union (DEU). Instead, more successful new parties have increasingly 
needed to pass through an extended incubation phase of resource accumulation, as 
what Hug (2001: 14-15) terms a ‘potential party’. This stage either takes the form of 
recruiting a cohesive, credible national-level elite, or of building up organisational 
presence and credibility locally as a grassroots municipal or regional grouping. In 
some cases, both strategies have been deployed simultaneously, or in rapid sequence.  
TOP09, for example, initially emerged in 2009 as a classic breakaway party based on 
elite networks of Christian Democrat politicians and businesspeople brought together 
by the former Christian Democrat leader Miroslav Kalousek. However, the new party 
rapidly sought to acquire a grassroots dimension by forming an alliance with the 
Mayors and Independents (Starostové a nezávislí) movement formed through the 
merger of successful independent groupings following the 2008 regional elections 
(Starostové a nezávislí 2009). The same sequence occurred in the case of Public 
Affairs, which formed as a Prague-based municipal party, but then sought to recruit 
experienced politicians and well known public figures to bolster its national 
leadership, mostly notably its leader, the former investigative journalist and television 
presenter, Radek John.
21
 These two patterns of pre-party building loosely correspond 
to Panebianco’s classic distinction between party formation through top-down 
‘territorial penetration’ and party formation by horizontal ‘territorial diffusion’ when 
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‘…local elites construct party organisations which are only later integrated’ 
(Panebianco  1988: 50). 
An additional element of new party formation highlighted by the Czech  case, not 
fully captured in the existing comparative literature, is the role of small local parties 
and persistent extra-parliamentary groupings in acting as institutional shells awaiting 
‘capture’ and subsequent re-launch by outsiders entering the political sphere. The 
Green Party (SZ), for example, was for many years a moribund force with few 
connections to environmental activists and a nondescript programme of piecemeal 
environmental protection and (sometimes illiberal) demands for law and order and 
greater social welfare. Only after ecologists and social movement activists took a 
conscious decision to join the party en masse in 2002 and take over its leadership into, 
did it acquire the recognisably ‘green’ political profile described above (Pečinka 
2003). Similarly, in the first four years of its existence Public Affairs functioned 
purely as a local party with activities confined to three Prague boroughs. Only with 
the entry of a group of wealthy supporters bringing significant resources in 2005 did it 
emerge in its current form (iDnes 2010). Filling the organisational ‘shell’ of a weak or 
moribund small party may allow political entrepreneurs entering the party-political 
arena to dispense with the initial registration formalities
22
 and provide a ready made 
political identity and framework for collective action.  
Drivers of Czech new party formation 
What does this suggest about the causes of changing patterns of Czech new party 
emergence success in the Czech Republic? And how can such change this be squared 
with the prolonged stability of the Czech party system before 2010?  Three broad 
types of explanation can be culled from the literature: 1) structural explanations 
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stressing the robustness and stability of established Czech parties; 2) conjunctural 
explanations related to configurations in the party system; and 3) institutional 
explanations relating, in particular, to changes in the party financing regime and the 
number of ‘second order’ elections. 
 
Legacies, cleavages and the robustness of established parties 
 
At one level, the weakness or success of new parties can be viewed as simply the 
obverse of the robustness of established parties. New parties, it can be argued, will 
emerge to fill political and electoral vacuum when existing parties fail. Robust 
established parties, able to maintain themselves organisationally and politically will 
be well placed to out-compete newcomers – especially over the longer term - and to 
recover when hit by internal splits, scandal or bouts of electoral unpopularity.  
Two distinct structural factors which might underlie the robustness of established 
parties can be identified in the Czech case.
23
 First, the unidimensional nature of Czech 
party competition - which has strongly and consistently centred on distributional 
conflicts - may have constrained opportunities for successful new party emergence by 
reducing the number of issues that new parties can easily take up: while it is possible 
for politicians to use agency to bring about realignments or build new electoral 
alliances from a new ‘mosaic’ of crosscutting cleavages, this is a highly demanding 
and difficult task often more easily accomplished by established parties (Deegan-
Krause 2006; Deegan-Krause and Enyedi..2010).
24
  
While cleavage approaches may explain the initial stability of the Czech party system 
compared to others in the CEE region, it offers no plausible explanation for trends in 
new party development across time. To address this puzzle, Deegan Krause and 
 20 
Haughton (2010; see also Deegan-Krause 2007), for example, suggest also the 
existence of a ‘floating’ (and usually latent) anti-corruption (or elite-mass) issue 
dimension in political competition that has become newly salient, fuelling the rise of a 
series of short-lived new parties, whose appeal rapidly degrades after initial electoral 
success and, in particular, entry into government (Deegan-Krause 2007; Deegan-
Krause and Haughton 2009). However, there is little evidence of the development of 
new cross-cutting cleavages or dimensions in Czech party competition and, if present 
in latent form, we are still left with the question of why it should suddenly have 
become salient. 
A second potential explanation can be found in the Czech lands’ history of ‘partyness’ 
and experience of interwar party democracy may have left legacies, which survived 
the communist period, allowing established parties to develop clearer programmatic 
identities, grassroots organisation and more sizeable electorates after 1989. Of the 
four most well established Czech parties over the past twenty years, three (the 
Christian Democrats (KDU-ČSL), Communists (KSČM) and Social Democrats 
(ČSSD) were ‘historic parties’ with political roots going back to the pre-communist 
period able to draw on a loyal (if small) core electorates of party identifiers at the 
outset of democratic competition in 1990. . Two (KSČM, KDU-ČSL) were also able 
to draw directly on organisational resources inherited from the period of communist 
one party rule.(Pšeja 2005).  
However, these organisationally robust successor parties were relatively minor actors 
in the Czech party system which largely failed to expand beyond niche electorates. 
Moreover, it is hard theoretically convincingly to specify mechanisms through which 
deep historic legacies might have been transmitted and operated.
25
 This leaves only 
the argument that established parties stabilised because they were able to build on 
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their initial advantage of being better organised and better supported during the 
immediate post-transition period formative stage of party politics. Moreover, the 
existence of better placed early front runner parties was hardly unique to the Czech 
Republic. In the CEE post-communist context other than voters’ ‘adaptive 
expectations’ and disproportionate levels of state funding for parliamentary parties, 
there were few plausible ‘lock in’ mechanisms explaining how such front runners 
could generate ‘increasing returns’ from initial success so to exclude new competitor 
parties. As has been widely noted, classic mechanisms of party- and party system 
‘freezing’ such as the encapsulation of key constituencies through mass social 
organisation; the growth of partisan loyalties among voters; or the clientelistic 
provision of selective benefits to key electoral constituencies are weak or absent in 
Central and Eastern Europe (Hanley et al 2008; Kreuzer 2009; Deegan-Krause and 
Enyedi 2010). Such expectations were confirmed empirically by the failure of many 
Central and East European states to progress beyond fluid party systems with many 
openings for successful new party emergence.  This suggests that in the case of the 
Czech Republic, factors affecting the ‘supply’ of credible and effective new parties, 
rather than shifts in underlying voter ‘demand’ for new parties or the historically 
conditioned robustness or established parties may be key to understanding patterns of 
new party (non-) success.   
 
Party system conjuncture 
Linek suggests that the proliferation of new parties after 2002 reflected public 
disaffection with the ‘Opposition Agreement’, the pact signed in 1998 by the Civic 
Democrats (ODS) and Social Democrats (ČSSD) allowing a minority ČSSD 
government to take office (Linek 2002: 128). However, this interpretation sits 
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uneasily with the continued trend for new party emergence in 2006 election, a period 
of sharp polarisation between the two main parties when both gained record votes 
(Hanley 2006).  The 1998-2002 period does seem to represent a type of conjuncture 
favourable for a certain type of new party with good potential for success:  the 
‘breakaway’ grouping.  
1998 saw the Freedom Union break away from Civic Democrats and –in reaction to 
the signing of the Opposition Agreement – to form the Quad Coalition (Čtyřkoalice) 
alliance with two small established parties, the Christian Democrats (KDU-ČSL) and 
the Civic Democratic Alliance (ODA), and the extra-parliamentary Democratic Union 
(DEU) party.
26
 Similarly, the period leading up to the 2010 election coincided with a 
period of declining popularity for both main established Czech parties at a time when 
they were again collaborating in government in an unusual way: on this occasion 
supporting a caretaker government of non-party technocrats formed to lead the 
country to early elections. In 2010, as in 1998-2002 (Roberts 2003), acute factional 
divisions in an established party combined with unpopularity of the two established 
major parties, seems to have offer the key incentive for politicians within an existing 
established party – bolstered by a sense of national political drift and stagnation - to 
form successful new breakaway party: the impetus for the formation of TOP09 came 
from a group of pro-market modernisers in the Christian Democratic Union (KDU 
ČSL) led its former leader Miroslav Kalousek. 
 
 
Changing financial incentives for new parties 
Since 1994 all Czech parties receiving at least 3 per cent of the vote nationally in 
elections to the Chamber of Deputies have received a small capped annual public 
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subsidy based on the number of votes received. Parties also receive a one-off votes-
related payment following elections to the Chamber to cover campaign expenses. The 
threshold for this was also initially set at three per cent of the national vote, but in 
2002 the threshold was lowered to 1.5 per cent following repeated Constitutional 
Court rulings that higher thresholds violated constitutional principles.
 
Moreover, at 
the same time a new system of a non-refundable ‘election fees’ replaced deposits, 
considerably lowering the cost of contesting elections for small, poorer new parties 
and, in particular, for new first time contender parties, which proliferated from 2002 
(Linek and Outlý 2008).
27
 
 
Second order elections 
A further significant change in opportunity structures facing parties has been the 
gradual development of a raft of ‘second order elections’ in the Czech Republic to a 
number of countervailing, sub-national and European institutions: the Senate (first 
elected in 1996), regional authorities (first elected in 2000) and the European 
Parliament (to which Czech MEPs were first elected in 2004).  In such ‘second order 
elections’ voters are generally more willing to consider voting for new parties (often 
as a form of protest), and results are rendered more unpredictable by low turnouts. 
Second order elections also represent an additional – and, in some cases, more easily 
accessible - source of public funding.
 28
 However, the precise nature of incentives – 
and which type of new parties they benefit – varies by institution. 
For example, the localised nature of Single Member District contests to the Czech 
Senate and absence of any national threshold for representation enables small ‘new’ 
parties to their concentrate their limited resources more effectively, focusing on 
localities where their chances of electoral success may be higher. Senate elections 
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thus provide strong incentives for new parties (often persistent minor parties) and well 
placed individual independents– usually popular local politicians, sitting senators who 
no longer have a party affiliation or prominent figures in public life - to work 
together. Nomination by a registered political party frees an independent candidate 
from the need to gather 1000 signatures, confers a recognisable programmatic 
political identity and may additionally bring some level of organisational and 
financial support. For a small ‘new’ party gaining a candidate who is personally 
prominent and/or has a strong local base – hence and has a reasonable prospect of 
being elected – enhances a party’s political profile and credibility, as well as bringing 
it annual state funding if ‘its’ candidate is elected.29 The election of the war 
correspondent and human rights activist Jaromír Štětina as a senator nominated by the 
Green Party (SZ) in 2004, for example, was widely seen as important in enabling SZ 
establish the political momentum, which helped it enter the Chamber in the 2006 
elections (Kneblová 2009). 
Elections to the Czech Republic’s 13 regional authorities,30 first held in 2000, 
constitute a further set of ‘second order’ electoral opportunities for new parties, albeit 
specific and narrower opportunities than elections to the Senate and European 
parliament. The smaller (regional) scale of these contests coupled with the use of 5 
per cent regional threshold for representation should, in principle, again offer 
opportunities to ‘new’ parties able concentrate electoral support and political 
organisation in certain parts of the country.
31
 At 15,000 crowns per region (€500-
€600), a sum equivalent to approximately a month’s average salary in 2000 when 
regional elections first took place, fees payable do not pose a significant financial 
obstacle to new parties. Regional representatives (unlike municipal representatives) 
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are also a source of an annual state subsidy of 250,000 crowns (currently 
approximately €10, 000) for the parties nominating them.  
Across the three sets of regional elections in the Czech Republic (2000, 20004, 2008) 
non-parliamentary parties and independents were consistently able to benefit from 
these opportunities, having gained representation in the majority of regional 
authorities in every election since 2000.  However, the scale of such representation 
has been limited, typically numbering  30-50 of the 675 regional representatives 
elected across the Czech Republic. As illustrated in figure 5, which gives the absolute 
numbers of regional representatives elected for minor (non-parliamentary) parties, 
regional groupings and independents, there has been no marked upward trend in 
representation of non-established parties at regional level, suggesting that the 
organisational and resource demands of region-wide campaigning are simply too 
challenging for many small ‘new’ parties. This is indirectly confirmed by examining 
the type of challenger parties gaining representatives in regional elections: with the 
partial exception of 2004, independents’ groupings have proved markedly more 
successful than non-parliamentary parties.  
 
[FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE] 
 
This is unsurprising given that such groupings usually originate as alliances of 
influential non-aligned local politicians or mayors, who have already gained a degree 
of grassroots support (Mareš 2005b). This therefore suggests that the regional elected 
tier in the Czech Republic represents an opportunity – and a route to party formation – 
for only one type of ‘new’ party:  ‘project of newness’ parties making non-political 
(or anti-political) appeals based on the experience of sub-national politics. Close 
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analysis of regional election results suggests that there may be a certain cyclical 
element to the development of such groupings. 
32
 
A similar function was played by elections to the European Parliament which have 
been held twice in the Czech Republic - in 2004 and 2009. As with elections to the 
Chamber of Deputies, parties need to meet a formal threshold of 5 per cent of the 
national vote to gain representatives.
33
 Despite this, on one occasion the ‘second 
order’ character of the elections and the presence of an unpopular mid-term 
government allowed new parties to gain representatives: in 2004 Association of 
Independents Lists – European Democrats (SNK-ED) gained 11 per cent (and two 
MEPs) and the Independent Democrats 8.8 per cent (and two MEPs). This success 
positioned both parties as more credible (and better financed) challengers in the 2006 
Chamber elections, although neither proved able to break through electorally. 
Similarly, although more mutedly, the surprisingly high 2.4 per cent polled by Public 
Affairs (VV) in the 2009 European elections – the first time the party had contested a 
nationwide election. 
Perhaps equally significant are the relatively low financial obstacles to participation 
and state funding in European election. Moreover, at 15,000 crowns (currently around 
€600) for each full electoral list, the charge levied on parties is by far the lowest for 
nationwide election in the Czech Republic. A one-off subsidy to cover election 
campaign expenses is also paid to parties contesting European elections, which 
receive more than 1 per cent of the national vote, a lower threshold than applies for 
the equivalent subsidy in parliamentary elections. In the 2004 European elections 
three parties which polled less than five per cent of the vote, qualified for such 
subsidies: of these, the Greens, the Right Bloc (PB) and the Union of Liberal 
Democrats (ULD).
34
 PB and ULD polled less than 1.5 per cent - a level of support 
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which would not have qualified them for campaign subsidies in elections to the 
Chamber of Deputies. Similarly, in 2009 excluding the Greens (already a 
parliamentary party) seven parties with less than five per cent qualified for subsidies. 
Of these five polled less than 1.5 per cent.
35
  
The 2009 European elections served as a spur for new party formation. Ideological 
disputes within the Civic Democratic Party over ratification the Lisbon Treaty led to 
the creation of the eurosceptic formations Libertas.cz and the Party of Free Citizens. 
At the same time some sitting MEPs elected in 2004 for new challenger parties 
created new parties as political vehicles to ensure their re-election in 2009: following 
differences with the Association of Independent Lists-European Democrats (SNK-
ED) for whom she was elected an MEP in 2004, former diplomat Jana Hybášková 
created the European Democratic Party (EDS) in 2008, while in 2009 Jana 
Bobošíková, a former television presenter elected to the European Parliament on the 
Independent Democrats (NEZ) list in 2004, created the Sovereignty grouping which 
polled unexpectedly well in 2010 national parliamentary elections.
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Conclusions 
This article has examined the nature of new parties – and the incentives and 
opportunities facing new parties – in the Czech Republic during the period of its 
apparent consolidation and stabilisation in years 1996-2010. As close examination of 
the Czech case shows, the ‘newness’ of new parties is neither given, nor conceptually 
or empirically straightforward. Party ‘newness’ can cover a range of phenomena 
including party origins, appeals and (non-)parliamentary status. Few ‘new’ parties, the 
Czech case suggests, will be new in all these respects. National party systems, it 
seems likely, will thus generate different but predictable distributions of ‘new’ parties.  
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Following from this, it seems likely that patterns of (successful) new party 
development will vary markedly by type across national different contexts: successful 
new parties in the Czech Republic have generally programmatically been ‘purifiers’ 
and, in terms of their origins, breakaways from existing parties.  A CEE polity with a 
more multi-dimensional party competition, a different configuration of second order 
elections or more loosely structured established parties could be expected to generate 
a different prevalent type of successful new party. This, in turn, highlights how 
different types of new party are facilitated (or blocked) by different mechanisms. 
Thus, while new first time contenders in the Czech Republic appear to have been 
highly sensitive to financial incentives, the development of breakaway parties seems 
conditioned more by favourable conjunctures in the party system, that lead established 
politicians to calculate that a new party venture could succeed. When such ‘new’ 
breakaway parties are launched, they often achieve relatively high level of electoral 
success compared to new parties with other types of origin. Similarly, while  ‘second 
order’ elections generally play a role as an incubator for new parties, they vary in type 
incentives they offer with certain second order elections offering a more favourable 
environment for the development of certain new party types. 
What do such patterns tell us about possible faultlines in the Czech party system that 
might have transmitted the shocks resulting in the ‘political earthquake’ of 2010? Of 
the two highly successful new parties that emerged in 2010, Public Affairs (VV) 
appears by far the more novel. As a breakaway, ‘purifier’ party TOP09 fits with an 
earlier, if rare, pattern of Czech party development, paralleled by the emergence of the 
Freedom Union (US) in 1997-8. Public Affairs, although loosely fitting with a broad 
pattern of resource mobilisation in which local independents’ groupings gathering 
enough momentum to enter the national arena as a ‘project of newness’ parties is 
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more unusual. As a new first time contender Public Affairs (VV) was exceptional in 
its immediate, huge electoral impact, which would not have been expected from 
earlier patterns of Czech new party emergence.   
Although party system conjuncture was clearly related to its success, this 
distinctiveness seems explicable primarily in terms of a distinct pattern of resource 
mobilisation: the injection of significant private resources into an embryonic new 
minor party by a wealthy private individual, the businessman Vít Bárta (MFDnes 
2011; Kmenta 2011). 
37
 Although an unusual development in the Czech Republic, 
such a pattern of new party formation is familiar in contexts such as Latvia and 
Estonia -  where the creation of  ‘pocket parties’ by wealthy patrons is common (Sikk 
2009, 2011; Bengtsson 2011) -  and seems to  fit with the broader trend towards what 
Hopkin and Paolucci (1999) term the ‘business firm’ model of party: the creation of 
new party organisation as loose, personality centred shell structure with neither 
meaningful membership nor administrative apparatus, replacing them instead with 
loose networks of sympathisers and links to commercial providers.
38
 Such parties 
typically lack any fixed ideology using marketing to create, rather simply sell 
programmes resulting in a vague reformist appeal akin to Sikk’s ‘project of newness’.  
As the paradigmatic case of Forza Italia shows, such groupings are often created and 
led by businesspeople, who have the personal resources and commercial know-how to 
implement this strategy most effectively. A businessperson-turned-party founder can 
also often credibly present themselves as an anti-political outsider offering a new way 
of ‘doing politics’.39 
Public Affairs’ early transformation by Vít Bárta into a vehicle for advancing his 
commercial interests in Prague; symbiotic relationship with his ABL security 
company in terms of organisation, personnel and financing; focus on building 
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networks of registered sympathisers (veckáři) co-ordinated through internet and social 
media; and reliance on political marketing clearly meet the organisational criteria of 
the ‘business firm’ model. It is less clear, however, whether there was a distinct nexus 
between VV’s organisational origins and strategy and its ‘project of newness’ appeal 
and, although de facto leader, Bárta studiously avoided the role of businessman turned 
anti-politician.
40
 The distinctness of Public Affairs - and anomalousness of its success 
viewed against the background of Czech new party development – nevertheless 
underlines the need to integrate patterns of organisational formation and resource 
mobilisation into typologies of party ‘newness’, hitherto focused on the nature of 
political appeals and extent to which founding elites are external or internal to 
established parties. It also suggests that, even if it does not ultimately reshape the 
party-political landscape, the ‘political earthquake’ election of 2010 may, 
nevertheless, represent a turning point in patterns of Czech new party formation.
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Table 1: Sikk’s typology of new parties’ political appeals 
 
  Occupies a niche captured by  
an established party? 
  + - 
Ideological  
motivation 
Strong Purifiers Prophets 
Weak 
Project of 
“newness” 
Prolocutors 
 
Source: Sikk (2011:3) 
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Table 2: Political appeals of selected ‘new’ Czech parties 1996-2010 
 
  Occupies a niche captured by  
an established party? 
  + - 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ideological  
motivation 
Strong Purifiers 
 
 DEU 
US 
TOP09 
SNK-ED (2006) 
 
 
Prophets 
 
 
 
Republican    
splinter parties 
DSSS 
 
Sovereignty  
Weak Project of 
“newness” 
 
VV 
SPOZ 
SNK (2002) 
 
Prolocutors 
 
 
DŽJ 
Moravian 
regionalists 
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Figure 1 
 
Volitility by type over time in the Czech Republic
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 Figure 2 Votes for types of new party in elections to the Czech Chamber of deputies
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Source: Author’s calculations based on Czech Central Electoral Commission 
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Figure 3: Number of new parties contesting elections to the Czech Chamber of Deputies
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Figure 4: New parties contesting elections to Czech Chamber of Deputies as a proportion of 
all parties contesting 
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Source: Author’s calculations based on  Czech Central Electoral Commission 
 
Figure 5: Regional repesentatives of Czech minor and regional  parties 
and independent lists
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Appendix 
 
Tables 1-4: Categorisation of ‘new’ and established Czech parties 
 
Key 
p – persistent minor party 
n – first time electoral contender  
e – established party 
b – breakaway party contesting election for the first time 
 
 
1996 Election to Chamber of Deputies 
 
Party name (Czech) Party name (English) Vote % Category 
Důchodci za životní jistoty Pensioners for a Secure Life 187455 3.09 p 
Svobodní demokraté-LSNS 
Free Democrats – Liberal 
National Social Party 124165 2.05 p 
Mor.nár.str.-
Hn.slezskom.sjed. 
Moravian National Party – 
Movement for Moravian-
Silesian Unity 16580 0.27 p 
Demokratická unie Democratic Union 169796 2.8 n 
Nezávislí Independents  30125 0.5 n 
Česká pravice Czech Right 2808 0.05 n 
Občanská demokratická 
strana Civic Democratic Party 1794560 29.62 e 
Česká str.sociál.demokratická 
Czech Social Democratic 
Party 1602250 26.44 e 
Komunistická str.Čech a 
Moravy 
Communist Party of Bohemia 
and Moravia 626136 10.33 e 
Křesť.a dem.unie-Čs.str.lid. 
Christian Democratic Union – 
Czechoslovak People’s Party 489349 8.08 e 
Sdruž.pro rep.-Republ.str.Čsl. 
Association for the Republic 
– Republican Party of 
Czechoslovakia 485072 8.01 e 
Občanská demokratická 
aliance Civic Democratic Alliance 385369 6.36 e 
Českomoravská unie středu 
Bohemian-Moravian Centre 
Union 27490 0.45 e 
Levý blok Left Bloc 85122 1.4 b 
Hn.samosp.M.aSl.-
Mor.nár.sjed. 
Movement for Self-
Governing Moravia and 
Silesia – Moravian National 
Unity 25198 0.42 b 
Strana demokratické levice Party of the Democratic Left 7740 0.13 b 
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1998 Election to Chamber of Deputies 
 
Name (Czech) Name (English) Votes % Category 
Důchodci za životní 
jistoty 
Pensioners for a Secure 
Life 182900 3.06 p 
Demokratická unie Democratic Union 86431 1.45 p 
Strana zelených Green Party 67143 1.12 p 
Nezávislí Independents 51981 0.87 p 
Moravská demokratická 
strana 
Moravian Democratic 
Party 22282 0.37 p 
Česká strana národně 
sociální 
Czech National Social 
Party 17185 0.29 p 
Občanská koalice-
Politic.klub 
Civic Coalition – 
Political Club 14788 0.25 n 
Česká str.sociálně 
demokrat. 
Czech Social 
Democratic Party 1928660 32.31 e 
Občanská demokratická 
strana Civic Democratic Party 1656011 27.74 e 
Komunistická str.Čech a 
Moravy 
Communist Party of 
Bohemia and Moravia 658550 11.03 e 
Křesť.demokr.unie-
Čs.str.lid. 
Christian Democratic 
Union – Czechoslovak 
People’s Party 537013 9 e 
Sdruž.pro rep.-
Republ.str.Čsl. 
Association for the 
Republic – Republican 
Party of Czechoslovakia 232965 3.9 e 
Unie svobody Freedom Union 513596 8.6 b 
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2002 Election to Chamber of Deputies 
 
Party name (Czech) Party name (English) Votes % Category 
Strana zelených (SZ) Green Party 112929 2.36 p 
Strana za životní jistoty  (SŽJ) Party for a Secure Life 41404 0.86 p 
Česká strana národně sociální 
(ČSNS) Czech National Social Party 38655 0.81 p 
Moravská demokratická 
strana  (MDS) Moravian Democratic Party 12957 0.27 p 
Romská občanská iniciativa 
ČR 
Roma Civic Initiative of the 
CR 523 0.01 p 
Strana demokrat.socialismu 
(SDS) 
Party of Democratic 
Socialism 475 0 p 
Republikáni Miroslava Sládka 
(RMS) Miroslav Sládek Republicans 46325 0.97 p 
Česká pravice Czech Right 2041 0.04 p 
Sdružení nezávislých  Association of Independents  132699 2.78 n 
Str.venkova-spoj.občan.síly 
Country Party – United Civic 
Forces 41773 0.87 n 
Naděje Hope 29955 0.62 n 
Pravý Blok PB Right Bloc 28163 0.59 n 
Volba pro budoucnost (VpB) Choice for the Future 16730 0.35 n 
Cesta změny (CZ) Path of Change 13169 0.27 n 
Strana zdravého rozumu  Party of  Common Sense  10849 0.22 n 
Akce za zruš.Senátu a proti t. Action to Abolish the Senate 9637 0.2 n 
Balbínova poetická strana  Balbín Poetic Party  9287 0.19 n 
Humanistická aliance Humanist Alliance 8461 0.17 n 
Národně demokratická strana National Democratic Party 5532 0.11 n 
Demokratická liga Democratic League 4059 0.08 n 
České sociálně 
demokrat.hnutí 
Czech Social Democratic 
Movement 602 0.01 n 
Nové hnutí New Movement 139 0 n 
Česká str.sociálně demokrat. 
Czech Social Democratic 
Party 1440279 30.2 e 
Občanská demokratická 
strana  (ODS) Civic Democratic Party 1166975 24.47 e 
Komunistická str.Čech a 
Moravy (KSČM) 
Communist Party of Bohemia 
and Moravia 882653 18.51 e 
Koalice KDU-ČSL, US-DEU 
Coalition of  KDU-ČSL, US-
DEU 680671 14.27 e 
Občanská demokratická 
alliance (ODA) Civic Democratic Alliance 24278 0.5 e 
Republikáni Republicans 6786 0.14 b 
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2006 Election to Chamber of Deputies 
 
Party (Czech) Party (English) Votes % Category 
Strana zelených Green Party  336487 6.29 p 
NEZÁVISLÍ Independents 33030 0.61 p 
Strana zdravého rozumu Party of Common Sense 24828 0.46 p 
Pravý Blok Right Bloc 20382 0.38 p 
Moravané Moravians 12552 0.23 p 
Balbínova poetická strana Balbín Poetic Party 6897 0.12 p 
Humanistická strana Humanist Party 857 0.01 p 
Česká pravice Czech Right 395 0 p 
SNK Evropští demokraté 
Association of Independent Lists -  
European Democrats 111724 2.08 p 
NEZ.DEMOKRATÉ 
(předs.V.Železný) Independent Democrats 36708 0.68 n 
Právo a Spravedlnost Law and Justice 12756 0.23 n 
STRANA ROVNOST ŠANCÍ Equal Opportunities Party 10879 0.2 n 
Národní strana National Party 9341 0.17 n 
Koalice pro Českou republiku Coalition for the Czech Republic 8140 0.15 n 
Koruna Česká (monarch.strana) 
Bohemian Crown (Monarchist 
Party) 7293 0.13 n 
4 VIZE-www.4vize.cz 4 Vision -www.4vize.cz 3109 0.05 n 
Česká str.národ.socialistická Czech National Socialist Party 1387 0.02 n 
Helax-Ostrava se baví Helax-Ostrava Has Fun 1375 0.02 n 
Folklor i Společnost Folklore and Society 574 0.01 n 
Liberální reformní strana Liberal Reform Party 253 0 n 
České hnutí za národní jednotu 
Czech Movement for National 
Unity 216 0 n 
Občanská demokratická strana Civic Democratic Party 1892475 35.38 e 
Česká str.sociálně demokrat. Czech Social Democratic Party 1728827 32.32 e 
Komunistická str.Čech a Moravy 
Communist Party of Bohemia and 
Moravia 685328 12.81 e 
Křesť.demokr.unie-Čs.str.lid. 
Christian Democratic Union – 
Czechoslovak People’s Party 386706 7.22 e 
Unie svobody-Demokratická unie 
Freedom Union – Democratic 
Union 16457 0.3 e 
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2010 Election to Chamber of Deputies 
 
Party (Czech) Party (English) Votes % Category 
Konzervativní strana Conservative Party 4 232 0.08 p 
Koruna Česká (monarch.strana) Bohemian Crown (Monarchist 
Party) 
4 024 0.07 p 
Pr.Blok  Right Bloc  24 750 0.47 p 
Moravané Moravians 11 914 0.22 p 
Sdruž.pro rep.-Republ.str.Čsl. Association for the Republic – 
Republican Party of Czechoslovakia 
1 993 0.03 p 
Česká str.národ.socialistická Czech National Socialist Party 1 371 0.02 p 
Humanistická strana Humanist Party 552 0.01 p 
Česká strana národně sociální Czech National Social Party 295 0 p 
Liberálové.CZ Liberals.CZ 260 0 p 
Dělnic.str.sociální spravedl. Workers Party of Social Justice. 59 888 1.14 n 
Věci veřejné Public Affairs 569 127 10.88 n 
Česká pirátská strana Czech Pirate Party 42 323 0.8 n 
Strana svobodných občanů Party of Free Citizens 38 894 0.74 n 
STOP STOP 3 155 0.06 n 
Suverenita-blok J.Bobošíkové Sovereignty - Jana.Bobošíková Bloc 192 145 3.67 n 
OBČANÉ.CZ Citizens.CZ 13 397 0.25 n 
Klíčové hnutí Key Movement 1 099 0.02 n 
EVROPSKÝ STŘED European Centre 522 0.00 n 
NÁRODNÍ PROSPERITA National Prosperity 186 0 n 
Komunistická str.Čech a Moravy Communist Party of Bohemia and 
Moravia 
589 765 11.27 e 
Křesť.demokr.unie-Čs.str.lid. Christian Democratic Union – 
Czechoslovak People’s Party 
229 717 4.39 e 
Strana zelených Green Party 127 831 2.44 e 
Česká str.sociálně demokrat. Czech Social Democratic Party 1 155 26
7 
22,08 e 
Občanská demokratická strana Civic Democratic Party 1 057 79
2 
20.22 e 
TOP 09 TOP 09 873 833 16.7 b 
Strana Práv Občanů ZEMANOVCI Citizens’ Rights Party - Zemanites 226 527 4.33 b 
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Appendix table 5: Electoral support for types of ‘new’ party by election 
 
 1996 1998 2002 2006 2010 
First time electoral contenders 3.46 0.25 6.46 1.62 17.64 
First time breakaway contenders 2.22 8.98 0.14 0.23 21.03 
Persistent minor Parties 5.14 6.8 5.32 10.02 0.9 
Total 'new' 10.71 16.01 11.28 11.87 39.57 
 
 
 
Appendix table 6: Numbers of ‘new’ parties contesting elections by type  
 
 1996 1998 2002 2006 2010 
First time electoral contenders 2 1 15 12 10 
First time breakaway contenders 4 2 2 0 2 
Persistent minor Parties 2 5 4 9 8 
Total 'new' 10 9 21 21 20 
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Notes 
1
 Authors such as  Mainwaring et al  (2009) and Powell and Tucker (2009), who 
measure and compare within-system electoral volatility and extra-system volatility 
(shifts in electoral support from established parties to new challengers), conclude that, 
while high by international standards in the Czech Republic in 1996-2006 both forms 
of volatility were low compared to other Central and Eastern European states. Powell 
and Tucker also find that support for Czech new parties (as they define them) fell in 
every parliamentary election from 1996 to 2006.  
2
 The number of effective parties is calculated using the Laakso-Taagepera method. 
The calculation of votes for post-2008 parties seems to include Sovereignty, the 
Citizens’ Rights Party (SPOZ), the Workers’ Party of Social Justice (DSSS), 
Občané.cz, the Party of Free Citizens (SOS) and the Czech Pirate Party (ČPS).The 
far-right DSSS, which polled 1.14 per cent in 2010, is, however, perhaps best 
regarded as the continuation of a party founded in 2004.  
 
3
  The metaphor of the political ‘earthquake’ has also often used by political scientists 
to describe episodes of electoral change. Szczerbiak (2002), for example, 
characterises Poland’s 2001 election - which saw extensive new party emergence and 
party replacement on the centre-right - in this way on the grounds that the result was 
unexpected and opened up opportunities for major party system restructuring. The 
Czech 2010 election meets these broad criteria. However, there has been little effort 
to define or conceptualise the term. 
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4
 Sikk’s  (2005: 399) latter condition thus excludes as ‘genuinely new parties’ not 
only breakaway parties formed by the splits in existing parties,  but any groupings 
involving the participation of ‘former prime ministers or ‘significant portions of 
ministers and members of parliament’. 
5
  Other authors describe broadly the same phenomenon with different labels. Učeň 
(2007), for example, speaks of ‘centrist populism’ and Demker (2008) of ‘virtue 
parties’.  
6
 The development of parties and the party system have been key foci of Czech 
political science and there is a relatively large literature in both Czech and English on 
the subject as well as a number of reference works. 
7
 A more restrictive view might interpret the Czech party system as having formed in 
1990-1996 when the Czech Social Democratic Party (ČSSD) established itself as the 
main party of the centre-left in parliament. However, in my interpretation party 
system formation was completed earlier as ČSSD’s status was already evident by 
1994-5.  
8
 I diverge from this slightly in classifying the Green Party (SZ) and the National 
Socialists as extra-parliamentary parties. Although both had representation in the 
Czech (and Czechoslovak) parliaments in 1992, this was gained by a short-lived ad 
hoc coalition, the Liberal Social Union and each clearly lacked sufficient support to 
cross the five per cent threshold independently. 
9
 Sikk (2005), for example, sees ‘new’ parties as first time contenders + extra 
parliamentary parties, Tavits (2008)as new contenders + new breakaway parties.  
10
 Although authors disagree about whether ‘breakaway’ parties should be termed 
genuinely new, such ‘overlapping’ should not necessarily be regarded as making the 
categories derived from the literature incoherent. Indeed, such overlaps are common 
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in most ‘classically’ constructed typologies – for example, the categories of 
‘Communist Parties’ and ‘Conservative Parties’ ‘overlap’ because members of both 
groups are parties, but are meaningful and exclusive categories.  There can, however, 
be advantages in fuzzier ‘family resemblance’ approaches party typologisation. For a 
discussin see Sikk (2009) 
 
11
 This pattern can also be founded, on a smaller scale, the Citizens’ Rights Party 
(SPOZ) founded in 2009 by former Social Democrat Prime Minister Miloš Zeman 
and former leading Social Democrats. In the May 2010 SPOZ came close to crossing 
the five per cent threshold. 
 
12
 The typology of party appeals does not, it should emphasised, seek to explain the 
specific success or failure of individual parties in specific elections, which are 
affected by a multitude of factors beyond the nature of their political appeals.  
 
13
 Both US and TOP09 sought to project novelty and freshness in their political 
presentation and by introducing (minor) organisational innovations such as the 
recognition of sympathisers in party statutes. 
14
 As with the prominent centre-right ‘purifiers’ both the Left Bloc (LB) and Party of 
the Democratic Left (SDL) were breakaway parties, having been founded by leading 
members of the KSČM.  
15
 The two established parties on the centre-right, the Civic Democrats (ODS) and 
Christian Democrats (KDU-ČSL) offered distinct – and to some extent, diametrically 
opposed - policies:  the former secular, pro-market and individualist, the latter 
stressing the need for a social market, the development of social policy, greater 
recognition of the Church, decentralisation, civil society development. There was thus 
much more limited competition between the two. 
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16
 It is also problematic to classify the appeal of the Civic Movement – Free 
Democrats (OH-SD), which emerged from Civic Forum in 1991 as a major governing 
party but had become a minor political actor by 1996. Although OH-SD  policies 
overlapped with those of centre-right ‘purifer’ parties, its efforts to project itself as 
part of a distinct European liberal party family - including an ill-advised merger with 
the ‘historic’ Liberal Social National Party (LSNS) in 1996  -  lead  me, on balance, to 
classify it as a ‘prophet’ party. 
17
 Other strongly eurosceptic groups like Party of Free Citizens (SSO), which define 
themselves as a conservative free market parties standing up for principles abandoned 
by the Civic Democrats, clearly classify as ‘purifiers’. 
18
 Sovereignty seems formally to begun as a coalition between the Politika 21 party 
founded by Bobošíková in 2006 and the tiny Common Sense Party (SZR).  Although 
SZR contested the 2002 and 2006 elections to the Chamber of Deputies, I classify 
Sovereignty as new contender in 2010 as impetus and leadership clearly derived by 
Bobošíková’s group. 
19
 The inclusion of independents and (supposed) representatives of civil society is also 
characteristic of other ‘new’ party categories. For example, the Green Party offered 
places on its electoral list to signatories of the Brandýs Initiative manifesto in 2002, 
while Freedom Union recruited non-aligned academics and businesspeople as 
candidates. 
20
 The European Democrats (ED) were a small liberal party formed in 2002 by the 
former Civic Democrat mayor of Prague Jan Kasal. Its support and organisation were 
concentrated in Prague, where it performed strongly municipal elections in November 
2002.   
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21
 A similar rationale was given for the merger of Politika 21 and the Common Sense 
Party (SZR) to form Sovereignty, although there is little evidence that SZR has a 
strong grassroots presence (Suverenita n.d). 
22
 In the Czech case the main hurdle is the collection of a 1000 signature petition. 
23
 It has been suggested that the comparative size of gap in funding for parliamentary 
and non-parliamentary parties was one the principal reasons for the stability of the 
Czech party system (Linek and Outlý 2008). However, this claim, however, appears 
not to have been comparatively tested. Countries with comparable electoral and 
funding thresholds and a similar disproportionality of funding such as Estonia do not 
seem to have undergone significant party system stabilisation in consequence (Sikk 
and Kangur 2008).  
24
 Such unidimensionality may function, in particular, to close down the space for 
‘prophetic’ parties making new ideological appeals , leaving new parties with a 
limited range of usable political appeals the most potent of which might to position 
themselves as ’purifiers’. 
25
 Indeed, arguably the failures of the interwar Czech party system and, especially, the 
intense ‘partification’ of the state administration – in conjunction with the experience 
of communist one party rule - did as much to engender and reinforce Czech anti-
partyism, which still forms a strong current in public opinion. 
26
. DEU merged with the Freedom Union in 2001. 
27
 Under the new system parties fielding lists in all electoral districts had to pay fees 
totalling 200,000 Czech crowns (€8000 at current exchange rates), rather than 
deposits (forfeited by parties not entering parliament) of 1.6 million crowns 
(€64,000). 
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28
 However, Linek and Lyons’ (2007) study of parliamentary and European elections 
in the Czech Republic and Slovakia finds that Second Order Election Thesis is 
mediated by regional context. 
29
  No similar subsidy is paid to senators elected without a party nomination.  
30
 Prague functions de facto as a fourteenth region, but is formally speaking a 
municipality with special powers. Election to Prague’s elected city council take place 
in the same years as local, rather than regional election. 
31
 The regional assemblies’ size (45-65 members) does not impose a higher effective 
threshold. 
32
 In 2000 regional elections national independents’ groupings (SNK, Nezávislí) were 
the most successful type of challenger party. However, by 2008 such groups had, 
through a process of alliance-making and merge, evolved into nationally organised 
minor parties – Nezávislí became the basis of the Independent Democrats of Vladimír 
Železný, while SNK had merged with the European Democrats into a conventional 
party of the reformist liberal right – and were  replaced in regional assemblies by a 
variety of purely regional groupings. As noted, following the 2008 regional election 
many coalesced into the national Mayors and Independents grouping that has allied 
itself with TOP09. 
33
 However, given that the Czech Republic elects 22 MEPs and functions as a single 
electoral district in European elections reduces, the (mean) effective threshold is 
somewhat lower. 
34
 The ULD was a coalition of small pro-market parties Civic Democratic Alliance 
(ODA), Freedom Union – Democratic Union (US-DEU), Path of Change (CZ) and 
the Liberal Reform Party (LIRA). 
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35
 These parties were Sovereignty (Suverenita), the Right Bloc, the European 
Democratic Party (EDS), Public Affairs (VV), Mayors and Independents, the Party of 
Free Citizens (SOS), SNK-ED and the Workers Party (DS). The far right DS was later 
dissolved by court order as unconstitutional, but later re-formed under a similar name. 
The Libertas.cz grouping narrowly fell below one per cent. 
36
 The grouping’s full name was initially Sovereignty – the Jana Bobošíková Bloc, 
amended in 2011 to Sovereignty – Bloc of the Future (SBB). It seems initially to have 
been coalition between the party founded by Bobošíková in 2006 (originally called 
Politika 21, later re-named Sovereignty) and the tiny, populist Common Sense Party 
(SZR). 
37
 Bárta’s goals in financing and developing Public Affairs seem to have been limited 
to municipal politics  in Prague and other large urban centres and regions. VV’s 
meteoric rise in national politics seems to have derailed these plans, subjecting Bárta 
to immense media scrutiny and leading him into an unplanned role as into an 
unplanned role as a government minister and national politician. 
38
 Hopkin and Paolucci suggest that the ‘business firm’ model takes trend towards 
party professionalisation and disengagement from civil society to their logical end. 
 
39
 Such appeals were central to, for example, the rise of business-politicians Silvio 
Berlusconi and Forza Italia in 1994 and Ross Perot’s well supported third party 
campaign for the US presidency in 1992, when he polled 18.9% of the popular vote 
(Brown 1997; Pasquino 2007). 
40
 Bárta was not a member of the party and formally took only secondary roles inVV 
as campaign manager and later MP and (briefly) minister. 
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41
 The continuation of this pattern is suggested, for example, by the creation in 
October 2011 by millionaire businessman Andrej Babiš of the anti-corruption, reform 
movement ANO 2011 which is to be registered as a political party to contest 
parliamentary elections in 2014 (iHned 2011).  
 
